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I am honoured to have been asked to participate in this final panel 
debate in such distinguished company. What I intend to bring to this 
panel is an account of how Sveriges Riksbank, an inflation-targeting 
central bank, takes into consideration developments in asset prices, 
house prices in particular, and our experience thus far of doing so. 
Hopefully this account will be of interest, since it illustrates some of 
the challenges—analytical and pedagogical—that policymakers face 
when deciding on the appropriate way of bringing asset price devel-
opments into monetary policy decision making.
In going through events in the past few years I will also touch on 
the criticism that the Riksbank has received from various directions— 
members of the public in Sweden, financial market participants and 
from some members of academia. As a matter of fact, some of the 
criticism levelled at the Executive Board has come from within the 
Bank, i.e., from members of the staff. As I will elaborate below, this 
reflects that there are no simple answers to the question of what the 
proper role is for house prices in an inflation-targeting framework. 
Let me say at the outset what I and other members of the Execu-
tive Board have said on many occasions—Sveriges Riksbank does 
not have a target either for the level of house prices or for house price 
inflation, or for any other asset price for that matter. However, when 
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we observe long periods of high growth rates in asset prices and debt, 
growth rates that appear to be unsustainable in the long run, our 
view is that it is not reasonable to completely ignore that there may 
be risks associated with this, even though it is difficult to give con-
sideration to these risks in any simple manner in our regular forecast-
ing process. What this view has meant in practice is fairly marginal 
changes in the timing of our interest rate changes, and substantial 
public oral and written focus on the issue. Having said that, and for 
the benefit of those not familiar with the monetary policy framework 
in Sweden, let me provide a short background.
Sveriges Riksbank is an inflation-targeting central bank, having ad-
opted an explicit target for inflation in 1993, effective from 1995. 
Our goal is to keep inflation at 2 percent in terms of changes in the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI). The regime has now been in place for 
well over ten years, and there is broad agreement that the regime has 
been a successful one; CPI-inflation has been low and stable over the 
period, averaging around 1.3 percent, while the real economy has ex-
perienced annual growth of around 3 percent. Measures of underly-
ing inflation that exclude the effects on CPI of our own interest-rate 
changes have been closer to the target of 2 percent, as have inflation 
expectations (see Chart 1).
Since my remarks are to be on the role that house prices have played 
in Swedish monetary policy in recent years, the following should be 
noted too. Since 1996 nominal house prices in Sweden have more 
than doubled (the increase is around 140 percent, see Chart 2) and 
the average price for a co-op condominium has risen even more. The 
corresponding figures concerning the increase in housing prices are 
for the UK +220 percent, the US +110 percent, Australia +140 per-
cent. In recent years, household borrowing has also increased, both 
in absolute terms and relative to household income.
Rapidly growing house prices and household indebtedness were 
increasingly highlighted by members of the Executive Board from 
around 2004 and onwards. From 2006, statements regarding the de-
velopment of house prices and household indebtedness have often 
been included in press releases following monetary policy decisions, 










































Inflation Expectations in Sweden:
Money Market Agent Expectations, Annual Percentage Change
Chart 2
Real Estate Prices 
Index 1996 4th Quarter = 100
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The Role of House Prices in an Inflation-Targeting Regime
With these institutional and other details in place, let me turn to 
a more general discussion of the role of house prices in an inflation-
targeting regime. 
As we are all well aware, the debate regarding the role of house pric-
es in the formulation of monetary policy has yet to settle in a work-
ing consensus. There are many ways in which the different views in 
this ongoing debate can be summarized. Without claiming to have 
captured all views, and perhaps exaggerating a bit, let me mention 
three: “textbook flexible inflation targeting,” “leaning against the 
wind,” and “extending the forecast horizon.” Let me elaborate on 
each category in turn, and then return to our view.
Textbook Flexible Inflation Targeting 
The textbook account of a flexible inflation-targeting regime ex-
plains that when interest rates are set to bringing inflation back to 
the target, consideration is also given to the effects on the real econ-
omy; an appropriate balance between inflation and real variability 
is sought, which implies that an immediate reversal to the target is 
not an end in itself. Textbook accounts of flexible-inflation target-
ing typically give the following answer to the question of how asset 
prices should be factored into the monetary policy decision: Mon-
etary policy should respond to changes in asset prices to the extent 
that they affect the inflation and growth forecasts. Thus, there is no 
independent role, for example, rapidly rising house prices. Their ef-
fect on the monetary policy decision should come only through their 
effect on the inflation and growth forecasts. This recommendation, 
and the assumptions on which it is based, is something I will com-
ment more on below. 
Leaning Against the Wind 
Another view often put forward is that a central bank can bring 
about better outcomes for inflation and output by reacting to rap-
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and growth. In short, there are two arguments for this: (I) engag-
ing in such behaviour—let’s call it “leaning against the wind”—in 
situations when an asset price is changing due to non-fundamentals 
can dampen the effects of the unmotivated price change on the real 
economy and thereby prevent an inefficient allocation of resources; 
(II) if the market knows that the central bank engages in “leaning 
against the wind” activities, the probability will fall of non-funda-
mental price changes arising in the first place. 
The key issue here is, of course, identifying price changes that are 
driven by non-fundamentals. This problem cannot be overly empha-
sized. But difficult or not, it is an issue that central banks cannot 
ignore. If prices of houses or other assets are partly driven by factors 
that are hard to explain and that are believed to give rise to inefficient 
allocations and risks of large fluctuations in real economic activity 
and inflation, such events will, in one way or another, find their way 
into our thinking about monetary policy.
Extending the Forecasting Horizon
In practice, most inflation-targeting central banks have chosen to 
adopt forecast horizons of two to three years, at least in external com-
munication and official documents. In this environment, the idea 
that a central bank can need to extend the horizon over which it 
constructs inflation, and output forecasts is one that has been heard 
from many central banks. Doing so may enable the central bank to 
take into consideration the longer-run consequences on inflation and 
production of potentially large movements in asset prices and levels 
of indebtedness that have been built up over long periods of time.
From a theoretical perspective, central banks should always look at 
inflation and growth over the indefinite future, and thus this seems 
a reasonable proposal. At the same time, one must remember that in 
practice it is difficult to construct forecasts for longer horizons that 
actually contain more information than is contained in the forecast 
for the coming two to three years. Also, the horizon may, in fact, have 
to be very long to illustrate the issues at hand. 438  Stefan Ingves
The Riksbank View
The monetary policy strategy followed by the Riksbank is that of 
flexible-inflation targeting. When setting interest rates we consider 
not only the outlook for inflation but also the development of the 
real economy. In most situations, monetary policy is focused on 
bringing inflation back to target within a two-year horizon, which 
is deemed as providing enough time to allow consideration to be 
given to developments in the real economy. In certain circumstances 
if inflation has deviated substantially from the target, it is reasonable 
to let inflation return to target at a slower pace, provided this does 
not undermine the credibility of the inflation target. Doing so will 
dampen the effects on the real economy of the policy measures that 
are adopted in order to return inflation to the stipulated target. 
Described in this way, the Riksbank’s strategy is close to the text-
book treatment of flexible-inflation targeting. However—and here I 
come to an area where the Riksbank has recently been criticized—
we do also allow for taking into consideration developments in asset 
prices, including house prices. As explained in the policy document   
“Monetary Policy in Sweden”:1
 “The paths of asset prices and indebtedness can at times be either dif-
ficult to rationalize or unsustainable in the long term. This means that 
there are risks of sharp corrections in the future which, in turn, affect the 
real economy and inflation. …In practice, taking risks of this kind into 
consideration can mean that interest rate changes are made somewhat 
earlier or later, in relation to what would have been the most suitable ac-
cording to the forecasts for inflation and the real economy.” (p. 15-16)
Why is such a statement included in the Riksbank’s monetary pol-
icy strategy? Why is it, for instance, not sufficient to simply follow 
the prescriptions of the textbook account of flexible-inflation target-
ing? This type of criticism was raised in a recent external evaluation 
authored by Francesco Giavazzi and Frederic Mishkin.2
A close adherence to the textbook account of flexible-inflation 
targeting requires a belief that the analytical tools and models cur-
rently available have accurately captured the important linkages in 
the economy. It requires a belief that we, as central bank economists, 
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transmission  mechanism.  In  my  opinion—which  is  neither  very 
original nor controversial—we are not quite there yet. 
One such area in which our understanding can be improved con-
cerns the credit markets. A fundamental problem is that we presently 
lack the analytical tools that accurately capture the role played by credit 
and house prices in the economy. The research of Chairman Bernanke 
and others regarding the importance of collateral constraints and the 
financial accelerator effects on firms investment have paved the way 
for an increased understanding of these complex issues.3 Their research 
has been extended by others to the household sector—the idea being 
that as house prices increase, credit-constrained households are able to 
engage in so-called mortgage equity withdrawals and raise their con-
sumption. In time, insights from these models will help us to better 
analyze house prices and household debt in integrated, general equilib-
rium setups. In fact, this is an area into which the Riksbank is putting 
some modelling efforts, trying to understand how credit markets can 
be integrated with our general equilibrium approach to fluctuations in 
growth and inflation.4
In the future we will hopefully be better able to analyze how devel-
opments in asset prices influence the future course of inflation and 
output, and how the monetary transmission mechanism is affected 
by changing asset prices. Until we are confident that our various for-
mal models adequately capture the risks that we in the Executive 
Board are concerned about, we will have to continue relying heavily 
on judgement when taking such effects into account in the conduct 
of monetary policy. 
Let me reflect a bit on what, in my mind, has brought about this 
stance. On the one hand, we normally talk about inflation targeting 
in a two-year time perspective, on the other hand there are risks asso-
ciated with credit and asset prices that may lead to substantial devia-
tions from the forecasted inflation and output paths. The judgement 
issue then becomes one of meeting, or not meeting, the target at the 
two-year horizon versus the risk of costly deviations both within and 
beyond the normal forecast horizon. Such deviations are likely to 
be low-probability events but with high costs in inflation and real 
terms, should they occur. We know that these developments are very 440  Stefan Ingves
hard to predict using the standard models we normally rely on, but 
I do believe it is our responsibility ex ante to reflect on how to avoid 
future negative outcomes. The nature of such outcomes will vary 
depending on what part of the asset market that generates the risks, 
the market microstructure available for sorting out a problem in an 
efficient manner, and the extent to which monetary policy is able to 
counteract the risks. Here we certainly can deepen our understand-
ing of how different imbalances unwind and what the costs are. We 
often talk about asset markets in very general terms without going 
into any great detail.
In this context one can argue that monetary policy is a blunt in-
strument and considerations of risks associated with credit and as-
set markets should be left to the supervisory structures in place. In 
principle, supervisory rules can be fine-tuned towards different asset 
markets in a more precise way than monetary policy. If prudential 
rules are, or become, binding we are also likely to see some macro-
economic consequences of these policies. In my view, it is far from 
obvious how much weight is to be put on monetary policy and how 
much on supervision. Monetary policy can play a role, albeit perhaps 
a limited one, not the least because this will help to manage infla-
tion expectations over the long term. Furthermore, when imbalances 
build up monetary policy and supervision can support one another. 
Criticism from Different Sides…
I mentioned in the beginning that we have been criticized from 
many angles. Thus, in the very same year that an outside review came 
to the conclusion that the Riksbank had given too much indepen-
dent weight to house price developments, other Riksbank watchers 
criticized us for neglecting the ongoing buildup in house prices and 
debt levels. Some market commentators in Sweden have in the past 
year referred to the rapidly rising house prices as a reason for in-
creasing the repo rate at a substantially faster rate than our published 
interest rate forecasts.5 House prices have, as I mentioned in the in-
troduction, increased by 140 percent since 1996; annual changes are 
now in the vicinity of 8 percent, down from around 13 percent a year 
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subject of much attention in the media, and calls have been made for 
the Riksbank “to do something about it.” 
Here some pedagogical challenges arise. We must explain that we 
do not target house prices, but that we do not ignore risks associated 
with them. This is far from having a target for house prices. House 
prices vary in response to changing economic conditions, one of them 
being the stance of monetary policy. In Sweden, as in many other 
countries, house prices have increased in an environment character-
ized by strong macroeconomic conditions, rising disposable incomes 
and increasingly sophisticated financial markets. In this environment 
it is impossible to pinpoint an appropriate rate of change in house 
prices. But policymakers always have to take decisions under a high 
degree of uncertainty. 
Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, let me say that we have tried to be open and honest 
about the uncertainties surrounding the effects of house price devel-
opments on the rest of the economy and the appropriate monetary 
policy response. We have, in fact, been open about our own uncer-
tainties and the differences in opinion, albeit small, that have arisen 
at times. This may have given rise to “confusion about the confu-
sion.” But one could also say this comes with transparency—outside 
observers were very aware of the discussions that were being held and 
the uncertainties involved. 
Inflation targeting so far has proved to be a successful way of con-
ducting monetary policy, but there are unresolved issues, and one 
concerns the treatment of house and other asset prices; it has been 
hard to formally fit asset price developments into the frameworks re-
searchers and central banks use when they study inflation targeting. 
The models currently available to us and other policymakers, while 
indispensable as tools for organizing our thoughts concerning difficult 
matters, are incomplete representations of complex economies and 
cannot be the sole input into our analysis. Thus, while the academ-
ic community and researchers at central banks—including Sveriges 
Riksbank—continue their efforts to formulate models that combine 442  Stefan Ingves
firm founding in economic theory with good empirical properties, 
policymakers have to use judgement and take into account those rela-
tionships that history and experience suggest are of importance.
In my view it is well worth keeping an eye on house prices and oth-
er asset prices and passing judgement on the risks that their develop-
ments may give rise to. If the probability of very negative outcomes 
can be reduced ex ante, I believe this to be a good thing and a better 
solution compared to picking up the pieces ex post. Housing and Monetary Policy: A View from an Inflation-Targeting Central Bank  443
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